Skip to content
Vertex Tracker

MI5's Alert on China's Relentless Spying Attempts in the UK

An unexpected contact on LinkedIn. A proposal of employment from a headhunter, most likely a female agent, operating from the Asian nation. The chance to earn perhaps £20,000 part-time preparing a handful of political analyses for a Chinese company containing “non-public” or privileged information. Payment in digital currency or cash favored.

It might appear obvious, in this scenario, that something about this approach would be amiss. Nevertheless, Beijing's influential intelligence agency continues to view it valuable to deploy headhunters to try it – leading MI5 to issue multiple warnings about their activity on the internet.

Large-Scale Contact Attempts on Social Media

In 2023, MI5 chief Ken McCallum stated Chinese agents were approaching Britons on the platform on an extraordinary scale, at a frequency of 10,000 over the previous 30-month period, seeking political, industrial, military and scientific classified information. However a new campaign targeting elected officials and Westminster has led the spy agency to act again.

A spying alert was issued on Tuesday via the offices of Lindsay Hoyle and his Lords equivalent: a brief presentation after the persistent attempts of Shirly Shen and Amanda Qiu to contact MPs, peers, their assistants, economists, thinktanks – anyone who might provide information.

Intelligence Approach and Legal Changes

In the curious style of UK security services, there was no official release of the security advice from MI5 or the Home Office. Yet the service knew its briefing note would leak once it was emailed out to Westminster. Republishing it in the press assists the wider public more easily recognize communications with a deceptive intent.

This warning has the effect of flushing out additional details from in and around Westminster, although that is not MI5’s main objective. The service aims for public figures to understand that just because exchanges on LinkedIn are less overtly risky as on other social platforms, it does not mean they are without risk.

Nor is domestic spy agency believed to have been responding to any specific incident in the legislature, although the recent actions occur after the awkward failure of the prosecution of a former parliamentary aide Christopher Cash and his associate another person on a technicality earlier in the autumn.

The two had been charged of spying for the foreign power – a charge they rejected – but failure to successfully conclude a prosecution under the now repealed previous legislation resulted in concerns that the UK's political system had been insufficiently defended.

Revised Legislation and China's Long-Term Interests

The law has now been changed, and the MI5 slide contains a reminder of its successor: “Individuals involved in spying operations face substantial legal consequences under the new security law.” This constitutes a crime if somebody engages in conduct that could potentially “materially assist a overseas spy agency”.

An obvious inquiry, however, is what Beijing has to gain. An elected representative who is outside ministerial roles will have restricted access of classified material, and an contact of theirs less so. But Beijing is particularly focused in the legislative body: for a time, in recent years, the Britain's approach to China on matters such as Huawei or the human rights situation or alleged atrocities was being influenced by parliamentarians.

Methodological Variations and Persistent Cyber Risks

In part there are cultural differences as well. Authoritarian governments like China’s export information gathering techniques and the scale of its spy network is vast, engaging 300,000 individuals. Chris Inglis, a American cybersecurity head under the US administration, commented it was occasionally assessed that “the Chinese have more English speakers engaged in this than we [western intelligence] have personnel with language skills”.

Beijing is willing to develop contacts over the extended period and at times even the agencies have found it difficult to distinguish between legitimate relationships and spying. “China has a low threshold for what information is considered to be useful,” security minister a government official informed MPs on this week, but a sudden turn in the political cycle may mean an individual quickly marginal turning important.

An alternative perspective to consider the relentless efforts at covert intelligence collection is in the wider context of the geopolitical contest between Beijing and the west at a threshold under the point of outright war. China has increased its hacking efforts, with the one campaign penetration of phone and data networks in 80 countries, and the another operation compromise of countless internet devices.

Chinese authorities is engaged in relentless attempts to find secret informants on British democracy via digital means because it wants to be challenging, to display power and because it can.

About the author

Aaron Collins

Maya Chen is a data scientist and tech writer specializing in AI applications for business analytics and digital transformation.

Vertex Tracker

Type to search articles.